Validate workflows / validate (pull_request) Successful in 13s
Add tools/build_wiki.py, which builds the five English wiki pages into wiki/, rewrites links so they work inside the wiki and reports pages that differ from their sources. Offline tests cover the conversion and assert that the committed pages are current. Task: MIL-005#3
69 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
<!-- Generated from guides/credentials.md by tools/build_wiki.py. Edit the source, not this page. -->
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> This page is generated from [`guides/credentials.md`](https://git.tirsystem.com/TirSystem/github-action/src/branch/main/guides/credentials.md). Changes made here are overwritten the next time the wiki is published.
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# Workflow credentials
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The sync workflow uses two secrets. Give each the least privilege that works,
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store it only as a Gitea secret, and rotate it when a person with access
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leaves.
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| Secret | Content | Used for |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `TOKEN_FOR_GITEA` | A bare token, a JSON string, or JSON with `GITEA_TOKEN` | Reading the repository (description, topics) and its push mirrors |
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| `CREDENTIALS_FOR_GITHUB` | JSON object with a non-empty `GITHUB_PAT` | Changing the description and topics of the GitHub mirror |
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## Minimum permissions
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These come from the Gitea and GitHub documentation and the API calls the
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workflow makes. They have **not been confirmed with a minimal token on this
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instance yet**; S05 should confirm them when the tokens are created.
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**Gitea token** (a personal access token of a user, not a deploy key; deploy
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keys do not work for the REST API):
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- scope `read:repository`
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- the user must be allowed to read the repository's push mirrors, which
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Gitea limits to repository administrators
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Calls made: `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}` and `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`.
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**GitHub token** (fine-grained personal access token):
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- Resource owner: the owner of the mirror repository
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- Repository access: only the mirror repository
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- Repository permission: **Administration: Read and write** (no other permission)
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- Set an expiry date
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Calls made: `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}`, `PATCH /repos/{owner}/{repo}` (description)
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and `PUT /repos/{owner}/{repo}/topics`.
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Format of `CREDENTIALS_FOR_GITHUB`:
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```json
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{"GITHUB_PAT": "<token>"}
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```
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## What the workflow checks before it changes anything
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The workflow runs a preflight and writes nothing to GitHub unless it passes:
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1. Both secrets exist and have the expected shape.
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2. Gitea accepts the token and the repository is visible with it.
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3. At most one GitHub push mirror is configured. With none, the run ends
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successfully without syncing and the GitHub secret is not read.
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4. GitHub accepts the token for the mirror repository **and** the token
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reports administration access to it.
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On success the log says `Preflight passed: Gitea and GitHub accepted the
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credentials.` Failures start with a category such as `[credentials]` or
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`[permissions]`; see [troubleshooting.md](Troubleshooting). No secret value
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is ever printed.
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## Rotating a token
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1. Create the new token with the permissions above.
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2. Replace the secret value in the repository or organization settings.
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3. Run the workflow manually and wait for `Preflight passed`.
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4. Revoke the old token.
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